Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

1984

Amniocentesis, Coercion, and Privacy
Charles E. Rice
Notre Dame Law School, charles.e.rice.1@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles E. Rice, Amniocentesis, Coercion, and Privacy, 4 J. Christian Jurisprudence 57 (1984).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/796

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

FOUR

Amniocentesis,
Coercion, and Privacy
Charles E. Rice

T

of the Supreme Court were
based on a right of reproductive privacy which the Court
in 1965 had discovered in certain elusive "penumbras formed
by emanations from the Bill of Rights."' This fictional right of
privacy was used by the Court to declare unconstitutional
virtually all state restrictions on abortion; according to the
Court's rulings, the states have no effective power to prohibit
abortion at any stage of pregnancy. Even in the third trimester,
the state may not prohibit abortion where it is necessary "in
appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother." 2 Since the Court defined the health of
the mother to include "psychological as well as physical wellbeing" and said that "the medical judgment may be exercised in
the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological,
familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being ofthe
mother,"' 3 the ruling is a license for elective abortion at every
stage of pregnancy up to the time of normal delivery.
One widely overlooked aspect of Roe v. Wade, however, is its
implicit sanction of compulsory abortion. As Professor Robert
Byrn noted in his definitive article on the decision:
It must be remembered that the Court in Wade rejected
57
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any absolute right of a woman to choose whether or not to
abort, and premised its holding on a limited right of privacy,
subordinate to compelling state interests. As one example of
an appropriate state limitation on the right of privacy, the
court cited Buck v. Bell (274 U.S. 200 [1927]) which upheld
the validity of a state statute providing for compulsory
sterilization of mental defectives whose affliction is hereditary. The state "interest" in that situation was, of course, in
preventing the proliferation of defectives.
It had been thought that Buck v. Bell died after the Nazi
experience, and its revival now is rather frightening. By
implication in Wade, the Court espoused the constitutional
validity of state-imposed, compulsory abortion of unborn
children diagnosed intrautero as mentally defective. Neither
the child's constitutional rights (of which the Court could
find none) nor the mother's right of privacy (which the
Court, by citing Buck, found limited by the state's "interest"
in preventing the birth of mental defectives) could, according
to the theory of Wade, be interposed to challenge such a
4
statute.
Fortunately, in the decade since Roe v. Wade, the courts have
not explicitly recognized the legitimacy of compulsory abortion.
However, technological developments have recently established the foundation for a compulsory eugenics program:
During the past decade, advances in the antenatal diagnosis
of genetic disorders have proceeded at a revolutionary pace.
Amniocentesis and karyo-type analysis of fetal cells have
made the detection of Down's syndrome (trisomy 21) and a
host of other chromosomal abnormalities almost routine. In
1979, 28.7% of all pregnant women in New York age 35 or
older underwent prenatal cytogenetic studies. Steady advances in ultrasonography, fetoscopy, biochemical screening, and the application of recombinant DNA technology to
fetal DNA promise that this diagnostic revolution will not
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soon subside. The advent ofantenatal diagnosis and the rapid
growth of university-based clinics that specialize in genetic
counseling have created a complicated liability problem for
obstetricians, pediatricians, and family practitioners. 5
Since 1975, courts have increasingly recognized a wrongful
birth cause of action in which physicians may be held liable to
parents for the costs of raising a defective child and related
to test for defects
damages where there has been either a failure
6
or negligence in administering the tests.
In "wrongful birth" cases parents sue for the costs of raising
handicapped children. The theory of the suit is usually either
that if the doctor had told them of the risks of birth defects the
child would not have been conceived or that, if they had been
told during the pregnancy that the child was likely to be
defective, they would have had an abortion. Other "wrongful
birth" cases involve the birth of normal children after a
sterilization operation which failed due to the negligence of the
defendant doctor.7 This paper is not concerned with this last
type of case, but rather only with cases imposing liability on
doctors for negligent counseling or testing as a result of which
the mother did not choose to abort her unborn child. In such
cases, courts have adopted three general lines of reasoning as to
the extent of damages that may be recovered:
There are cases in which courts have concluded that a
physician found negligent in a "wrongful birth action" can
be liable for the entire cost of raising and educating the child
until the child reaches majority. While it may appear
extreme, courts have held that the award of such damages is
proper.
Other -courts have held that while such damages are
cognizable, the benefit of watching a child achieve and grow
to maturity must be balanced with the cost of raising the
child. The value of the benefit must be assessed to mitigate
the cost of rearing the child. However, courts following
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either of these lines of reasoning have given no indication of
what monetary amount of damages would be considered an
appropriate award. Finally, some courts have rejected awarding such damages in cases involving wrongful birth actions,
indicating that such damages are not cognizable, too speculative, and an unrealistic burden for the physician.8
For example, in Karsons v. Guerinot,9 New York's intermediate appellate court allowed parents to maintain a cause of
action for the birth of a mongoloid child against a physician who
negligently failed to notify them of the risks of pregnancy and
availability of amniocentesis. And in Becker v. Schwartz, 10 the
highest court of New York held that a physician had a legal
obligation to warn a 38-year-old woman of the increased agerelated risk of bearing a child suffering from Down's syndrome.
In a companion case the court recognized a cause of action on
behalf of the parents of two children who had been born with a
hereditary kidney disorder because after the birth of the first
child the defendant doctors failed to warn them that the disease
was hereditary. In both instances the Becker court allowed the
parents to sue, but refused to permit the child to sue in its own
behalf.
In addition to wrongful birth actions, the courts have
recently recognized wrongful life causes of action brought on
behalf of the defective child rather than the parents. The child's
claim is not to recover damages for his physical or mental defect
or illness which was caused or aggravated by the doctor's
alleged negligence; rather it arises from maternal or genetic
conditions; it is that the doctor negligently failed to discover the
prospect of the child's birth defect or negligently failed to bring
that prospect sufficiently to the attention of the child's parents.
In order to establish causation, it is further claimed that, had the
parents been properly informed of the prospect of birth defects,
they would have practiced contraception or obtained an
abortion so as to prevent the plaintiff's conception or birth. The
essence of the claim is that the plaintiffs mere existence is a
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harm, and that but for the physician's breach of duty, the
plaintiff would not have been born.
Initially, in Gleitman v. Cosgrove" the New Jersey Court
rejected both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions. Jeffrey
Gleitman was born in Jersey City on November 25, 1959, with
substantial defects in sight, hearing, and speech. His mother
had contracted German measles one month after she became
pregnant with Jeffrey. When she was two months pregnant, she
routinely consulted Drs. Cosgrove and Dolan, who practiced
obstetrics and gynecology together in Jersey City. When she
asked the doctors several times during the pregnancy about the
effects of German measles, she "received a reassuring answer"
each time. After the birth of Jeffrey, Mr. and Mrs. Gleitman
sued the doctors to recover damages for the emotional effects
and added financial burden caused to them by the doctors'
failure to apprise them of the high risk of birth defects from
German measles. The parents' theory was that, if the doctors
had told them of the risks, they would have procured an
abortion and thereby would have avoided their emotional and
financial injury. There was no way that the birth defects could
have been minimized during the pregnancy; the alternatives,
therefore, were birth or abortion. More significantly, the
parents sued for wrongful life on behalf of the infant Jeffrey.
The court rejected by a majority vote of 4-3 all the parents'
claims, on their own behalf and on behalf of Jeffrey.
In Curlenderv. Bio-Science Laboratories,12 however, the court
recognized a wrongful life cause of action brought on behalfofa
defective child against a medical laboratory which negligently
administered a test to determine whether the child would be
likely to be born with a genetic defect. The court stated:
We construe the wrongful-life cause of action by the
defective child as the right of such child to recover damages
for the pain and suffering to be endured during the limited
life span available to such a child and any special pecuniary
loss resulting from the impaired condition. 0
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Significantly, the court indicated that in an appropriate case
the child might even be allowed to sue his own parents for
allowing him to be born:
One of the fears expressed in the decisional law is that, once it
is determined that such infants have rights cognizable at law,
nothing would prevent such a plaintiff from bringing suit
against its own parents for allowing plaintiff to be born. In
our view, the fear is groundiess. The "wrongful-life" cause of
action with which we are concerned is based upon negligently
caused failure by someone under a duty to do so to inform the
prospective parents of facts needed by them to make a
conscious choice not to become parents. If a case arose
where, despite due care by the medical profession in
transmitting necessary warnings, parents made a conscious
choice to proceed with a pregnancy, with full knowledge that
a seriously impaired infant would be born, that conscious
choice would provide an intervening act of proximate cause
to preclude liability insofar as defendants other than the
parents were concerned. Under such circumstances, we see
no sound public policy which should protect those parents
from being answerable for the pain, suffering and misery
which they have wrought upon their offspring. 14
No such action by the child against his own parents has been
sustained, but there is some logic in the comment by Dr.
Margery Shaw, acting director of the Medical Genetics Center
of the University ofTexas at Houston, that "it's inevitable" that
such an action will be allowed. "Physicians," in Dr. Shaw's
opinion, "may be required to warn patients that if they allow a
defective child to be born, they may incur a liability."' 5 In
response to the Curlender court's suggestion of a potential
parental liability, the California legislature enacted a statute
which relieves the parents of liability in such a situation and
further provides that the parents' decision shall neither be "a
defense in any action against a third party" nor "be considered
6
in awarding damages in any such action." 1
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Moreover, in Turpin v. Sortini the California Supreme
Court itselflimited Curlender,holding that a child born because
of a physician's wrongful failure to inform the parents of
possible genetic defects could not collect damages for being
allowed to exist, but could collect for the extra costs resulting
from the handicap. 17 In rejecting the allowance of recovery by
the child for his very existence, the court said:
The basic fallacy of the Curlender analysis is that it ignores
the essential nature of the defendants' alleged wrong and
obscures a critical difference between wrongful life actions
and the ordinary prenatal injury cases noted above. In an
ordinary prenatal injury case, if the defendant had not been
negligent, the child would have been born healthy; thus, in a
typical personal injury case, the defendant in such a case has
interfered with the child's basic right to be free from physical
injury caused by the negligence of others. In this case, by
contrast, the obvious tragic fact is that plaintiff never had a
chance "to be born as a whole, functional human being
without total deafness"; if defendants had performed their
jobs properly, she would not have been born with hearing
intact, but-according to the complaint-would not have
been born at all.18
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision in this area is
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 19 in which the Washington
Supreme Court expressly recognized causes of action for
wrongful birth and wrongful life. The suit was based upon
medical care that Mrs. Harbeson received from military
physicians who had prescribed Dilantin for her after she
suffered a grand mal seizure in 1970. In March 1971, while on
Dilantin, Mrs. Harbeson gave birth to a normal child. Thereafter, however, Mrs. Harbeson gave birth to two defective children who were diagnosed as suffering from fetal hydantion
syndrome, i.e., they suffered from mild to moderate growth
deficiencies, mild to moderate developmental retardation,
wide-set eyes, lateralptosis (drooping eyelids), hypoplasia ofthe
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fingers, small nails, low-set hairline, broad nasal ridge, and
other physical and developmental defects. Prior to the conception and birth of their children, Mr. and Mrs. Harbeson had
informed the military physicians that they were considering
having other children and inquired about the risks of ingesting
Dilantin during pregnancy. The physicians informed the
Harbesons that Dilantin could cause a cleft palate and temporary hirsutism in the fetus, but they did not conduct literature
searches or consult other sources for specific information
regarding the correlation between Dilantin and birth defects.
Mr. and Mrs. Harbeson and a guardian ad litem appointed
for the two defective children filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for Western Washington and since there were no
Washington cases concerning wrongful birth and wrongful life,
the federal court certified several questions concerning the
availability of these actions to the Washington Supreme Court.
In recognizing the existence of a wrongful birth cause of
action on behalf of the parents of the defective child, the
Washington Court stated:
That this duty requires health care providers to impart to
their patients material information as to the likelihood of
future children being born defective, to enable the potential
parent to decide whether to avoid the conception or birth of
such children. The duty does not, however, affect in any way
the right of a physician to refuse on moral or religious
grounds to perform an abortion. Recognition of the duty will
"promote societal interests in genetic counseling and prenatal testing, deter medical malpractice, and at least partially
redress a clear and undeniable wrong." (Rogers, Wrongful
Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Counseling and Prenatal Teaching, 33 S.C.L. Rev. 713, 737
[1982].20)
With respect to damages recoverable by the parents, the
Harbeson court held that they could recover medical, hospital,
and medication expenses attributable to their children's birth
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and defective condition, and damages for their own emotional
injury. In considering damages for the parents' emotional
injury, the court held that the jury would be entitled to consider
the countervailing emotional benefits attributable to the child's
birth.
Moreover, the Harbesoncourt held that the children could
maintain a wrongful life action in order to recover the
extraordinary expenses to be incurred during their lifetime as a
result ofthe congenital defects. The court limited this recovery,
however, by noting that the costs of such care during the child's
minority could be recovered once, and, therefore, if the parents
recovered them, the child could only recover costs incurred
during majority. Finally, theHarbesoncourt denied recovery of
general damages in wrongful life actions, noting that "measuring the value of an impaired life as compared to nonexistence is a
task beyond that of ordinary mortals .... ,,21
The rise of the causes of action for wrongful birth and
wrongful life is a direct outgrowth of Roe v. Wade. This point
was recognized last year by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in holding that physicians can be sued for failure to give
parents the information they need to decide whether to choose
abortion and that the damages can include the lifetime costs of
raising the child as well as the extra costs occasioned by the
child's handicap. Indeed, the court's opinion specifically
recognized the routine character of the wrongful birth action
once Roe v. Wade is accepted:
State courts have been quick to accept wrongful birth as a
cause of action since Roe v. Wade, because it is not a
significant departure from previous tort law. A case like this
one is little different from an ordinary medical malpractice
action. It involves a failure by a physician to meet a required
standard of care, which resulted in specific damages to the
plaintiffs. The government tries to separate this case from
those of ordinary medical malpractice by raising political and
moral questions concerning abortions, but the Supreme
Court has already settled that issue. In Roe v. Wade, the
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Court held that it was the mother's consitutional right to
decide during the first trimester of pregnancy whether to
obtain an abortion. The staff at the OB-GYN clinic at Fort
Rucker deprived Mrs. Robak of the opportunity to make an
informed decision when they failed to tell her of her rubella
and the potential consequences on her fetus. Because of this
negligence, the Robaks are faced with large expenses for
Jennifer's care and special treatment. As in any other tort
case, the defendant must bear the burden for injuries
resulting from its own negligence. "Any other ruling would
in effect immunize from liability those in the medical field
providing inadequate guidance to persons who would choose
to exercise their constitutional right to abort fetuses which, if
born, would suffer from genetic (or other) defects." Berman
v. Allen, supra, 404 A.2d at 14. The district court was
therefore correct in holding that the Robaks' complaint
22
stated a valid cause of action in wrongful birth.
The well-established wrongful birth cases and the emerging
wrongful life cases effectively compel doctors to inform expectant mothers of the abortion option at least in high-risk cases.
Under the fear of malpractice actions, this practice may extend
to all pregnancies. This trend will also force physicians to test
exhaustively for any remote indication of trouble in a pregnancy
and to make full disclosure of those risks to the mother. Since
physicians will be virtually relieved of potential civil liability if
the mother does have the abortion, the tendency will be for the
doctor to emphasize that option. The compulsion is only
directly applicable to the mother. Instead, it is an economic
compulsion of the doctor which in turn influences his relation
with the mother.
The availability of amniocentesis introduces an additional
pressure on physicians to promote the choice of abortion where
the test discloses fetal anomalies. Concurrently, other technological developments are making the performance of abortion a
private affair known only to the woman herself (and the victim
child). While the constitutional right ofreproductive privacy, as
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invented by the Supreme Court, is essentially fictional, with no
foundation in the Constitution, the New Biology is making total
reproductive privacy a reality. The typical abortion of the near
future will be accomplished chemically by way of pill, injection,
or other method capable of self-administration. For example, a
team of Swiss and French researchers has developed an afterconception pill that appears to be 100% effective in "preventing
pregnancies." The woman need only take the pill for two to four
days a month. It causes expulsion from the uterus of any egg
fertilized that month, thus inducing an early abortion. 23 This
pill, which is based on a hormone described as an antiprogesterone name RU-486, was described by WashingtonPost
columnist Clayton Fritchey as "making most surgical abortions
superfluous. ' 24 Similar products are undoubtedly in various
stages of development in the United States and other countries.
Since liberalized abortion was first proposed by the American
Law Institute in 1962, the right-to-life movement has concentrated on surgical abortion as the evil to be prevented. In that
context, the continual debates on phrasing of a human life
amendment, whether it should include exceptions and, if so,
which ones, etc., were relevant. Now, however, abortion is
becoming a private matter totally within the control of the
mother. We have, finally, caught up with the pagan Romans
who endowed the father, the paterfamilias, with the right to kill
his child at his discretion, only we give that right to the mother.
But it is all the same to the victim. The power of the law to
control private, elective abortions will be limited. The major
means of controlling such private abortions will be by licensing
and regulation of the abortifacient drugs or devices.
The privatization of the abortion act and the implicit
compulsion of physicians to recommend it require that the law,
if it is to restore the right to life, must first reestablish the basic
principle that all human beings are persons with respect to their
right to life. Such a restoration will help to maintain a climate
favorable to the promotion of widespread and spiritually based
respect for life which is essential if private, do-it-yourself
abortions are to be discouraged. The restoration ofpersonhood
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the unborn with respect to the right to life could also prevent
Durts from imposing liability on doctors for failing to counsel
arents as to the abortion option. And, finally, the recognition
f legal personhood for all human beings from the time of
onception would also protect the retarded, the elderly, and
thers endangered by the predictable extension of the principle
aat some innocent human beings can be defined as nonersons and killed at the discretion and for the convenience of
thers.
It is essential that the constitutional protections attach from
ae moment of fertilization, by using that phrase or another of
qual clarity. This is no mere academic point. Even the
upreme Court in Roe v. Wade admitted that if the unborn
hild is a person he cannot be killed by a legalized abortion in
ny case. 25 If the unborn child is not a person his life is no more
rotected by the Constitution than the life of a housefly. If
onstitutional protections attach to the unborn child, not at the
ioment of fertilization, but at some latter point, such as
nplantation in the womb, which generally occurs approxnately seven days after fertilization, it will legitimize early
bortions by pill, menstrual extraction, and other means. The
itrauterine device, for instance, almost certainly operates by
reventing implantation. It is, therefore, not a contraceptive
ut an abortifacient. With advancing technology, the abortion
f the future is likely to be by pill rather than by surgery. If the
onstitutional protections do not attach at the earliest moment,
iat is, at fertilization, there will be no constitutional impediient to the licensing of abortion pills for use at early stages of
regnancy and if they are licensed for use at an early stage, they
ill be used at every stage. Clearly, therefore, constitutional
rotection must be restored unambiguously from the very
eginning of life.

